Bill C-9 as per ChatGPT
Structural Issues in Bill C-9
Critical Analysis – Current Status as of 15 December 2025
Document date: 15 December 2025
Nature of the document: Legal and structural analysis.
Note: This document does not constitute legal advice.
Bill C-9 proposes significant amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code in relation to hate propaganda, hate-motivated offences, intimidation linked to access to certain locations, and the public display of symbols associated with terrorism or extremist ideologies. While the stated objectives of the bill—combating hate, protecting vulnerable groups, and preventing intimidation—are broadly supported, a number of serious structural concerns remain, even after amendments introduced during the legislative process.
One of the central issues lies in the introduction of a statutory definition of “hatred” into the Criminal Code. The definition relies primarily on subjective emotional states, describing hatred as a feeling stronger than dislike or disdain and involving detestation or vilification. This approach departs from earlier jurisprudence, particularly the decisions in Keegstra and Whatcott, where the threshold for criminal liability was set deliberately high and limited to extreme, sustained, and dehumanizing forms of expression. By lowering this threshold and focusing more heavily on inferred intent rather than clearly delineated conduct, Bill C-9 increases the risk of inconsistent interpretation and unpredictable enforcement.
Another significant change introduced by the bill is the removal of the requirement for the consent of the Attorney General before certain hate-propaganda prosecutions may proceed. Historically, this requirement functioned as an institutional safeguard, ensuring that only the most serious and well-founded cases resulted in criminal charges. Its removal facilitates the initiation of prosecutions at the local level and heightens the risk of reactive or politicized enforcement in socially sensitive contexts.
Bill C-9 also creates a new offence targeting the public display of symbols associated with terrorist entities or extremist ideologies. Although a recent amendment clarifies the distinction between Nazi uses of the swastika and its traditional religious or cultural uses, the offence remains broadly framed. Concepts such as symbols “primarily used” by a listed entity or symbols that may be “confused with” prohibited imagery remain imprecise and highly context-dependent. This ambiguity creates a real risk that symbolic expression situated at the intersection of history, education, art, or political protest may fall within the scope of criminal liability.
A further major innovation concerns the creation of a new offence addressing intimidation related to access to religious, cultural, educational, or community sites. The offence targets conduct carried out with the intent to provoke fear in order to impede access to such locations. However, the language employed is expansive and relies on inherently subjective concepts, particularly the notion of intent to provoke fear. The boundary between criminal intimidation and disruptive but lawful protest remains indistinct, raising concerns that legitimate demonstrations could, depending on context and perception, be swept into criminal enforcement.
The bill also introduces a profound shift in criminal law by transforming hate motivation from a sentencing consideration into a stand-alone criminal offence. This change places the accused’s internal mental state at the center of liability, rather than focusing primarily on the act itself. The maximum penalties associated with this new offence escalate sharply and may reach life imprisonment in certain circumstances. This structural shift raises serious questions regarding proportionality and exposes the provision to potential challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Expanded confiscation powers further contribute to the bill’s structural concerns. By authorizing forfeiture of property used “by means of which or in relation to which” an offence was committed, the bill adopts exceptionally broad language. This formulation could encompass personal devices such as phones, cameras, computers, or vehicles, even where their connection to the alleged offence is indirect. There is a risk that confiscation may take on a punitive character rather than serving its traditional evidentiary function.
Considered individually, each of these provisions raises interpretive and constitutional questions. Taken together, however, their cumulative effect is more troubling. The overall architecture of Bill C-9 expands discretionary enforcement powers while leaving significant areas of ambiguity unresolved. Civil liberties organizations have consistently warned that the combined impact of these measures may exceed what is necessary or proportionate to achieve the bill’s stated objectives.
As of 15 December 2025, despite targeted amendments, the core structural criticisms of Bill C-9 remain largely intact. Vague definitions, lowered intervention thresholds, expanded prosecutorial and confiscation powers, and persistent constitutional vulnerabilities continue to render the balance between public safety and fundamental freedoms uncertain and fragile.
